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WILLIAM B. FISCH*
Constitutional Referendum in the
United States of America
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States of America, as a federation of now 50 states
each with its own constitution and legal system still enjoying a large
degree of governmental autonomy within the national legal frame-
work, presents a strikingly mixed picture regarding the use of direct
democracy-the submission of proposed governmental action to a
popular vote-in law- and constitution-making processes. At the na-
tional level, direct democracy has never been used for either type of
enactment. At the state and local level, however, its use dates back
to colonial times and has been increasing gradually (though still not
universal) ever since. Since the mid-19th century, every new state
admitted to the union has been required by Congress to submit its
initial constitution to popular vote,' and all but one of the state con-
stitutions now require a popular vote to ratify all constitutional
changes proposed by the most commonly used methods. 2
In the language of the Populist and Progressive movements of
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, such direct democratic law-
making takes two forms: referendum, which submits proposed stat-
utes or constitutions or amendments thereof to a popular vote before
they can take effect; and initiative, which permits a relatively small
minority of citizens to frame proposals for legislative or constitutional
change and have them submitted to popular vote for adoption or re-
jection. Once it was generally accepted in American law (by the early
19th Century) that constitutions are a form of law distinct from and
hierarchically superior to ordinary legislation within a given system,
one could distinguish four principal types of direct-democratic law-
* Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
1. See WALTER F. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATES CONSTITU-
TIONS (1910) (hereinafter Dodd) at 61f.
2. Le., by the legislature (provided for in all states) or by initiative (provided for
in 18 states). Delaware is the lone exception. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,
THE BOOK OF THE STATES (2005) (hereinafter Book of the States), tables 1.2 and 1.3 at
pp. 12-14. The third method used by states, the constitutional convention, which is
typically reserved for major revisions or new constitutions, is not governed in this
respect by an explicit provision in the existing constitutions of about 1/3 of the states,
and there may still be some room for discretion in those states. See part III.A.1 of this
report below.
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making for comparison in terms of the breadth of legal acceptance
and the frequency of use: constitutional referendum (the most widely
accepted), legislative referendum, legislative initiative and constitu-
tional initiative (the least widely accepted).3 Nonetheless, the consti-
tutional initiative is recognized in a number of important states and
has produced a number of significant changes having impact both
within and beyond the borders of the states where they have been
adopted.
In this paper on direct democracy in constitution-making, I will
review the situation at the national level first, in the light of the pre-
vailing patterns in the newly independent states at the time of adop-
tion of the federal constitution in 1788-9. I will then address the
situation at the state level as it has evolved over the more than two
centuries of the federation's existence.
II. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
A. Pre-Constitutional National Precedent: the Continental
Congress and the Articles of Confederation
The only common institution created by the American colonies on
their own initiative in the revolutionary period was the Continental
Congress, which first convened in the fall of 1774, and from its second
convening in 1775 operated continuously, obtaining a more formal
status under the Articles of Confederation in 1781, until the govern-
ment created by the Constitution was formed in 1789. In this Con-
gress the colonies as such-eventually to call themselves states-
were the constituent units, acting through delegates sent by their
legislatures; 4 the institution's formal title under the Articles was
"The United States in Congress assembled." The first Congress im-
mediately adopted the rule that each colony had an equal vote in its
3. Austin Ranney, The United States of America, in DAVID BUTLER AND AUSTIN
RANNEY, EDS., REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY (1978),
at pp. 69-73. It appears that legislative referendum is the least used of the mecha-
nisms, see David Magleby, Direct Legislation in the United States, in DAVID BUTLER
AND AUSTIN RANNEY, EDS., REFERENDUMS AROUND THE WORLD (1994) (hereinafter
Magleby) at p.222.
4. In the beginning, of course, it was (with the exceptions of Pennsylvania and
Rhode Island) not the colonial governments sending delegates to the Congress, but
rather assemblies, congresses and conventions formed by those within each colony
who were seeking to end the abuses of British rule. See SAMUEL BEER, To MAKE A
NATION: THE REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1993), at 197:
"If we are looking for comparisons to help us classify the Continental Con-
gress as a political entity, we will be misled if we think of it as a meeting of
governments. A more instructive analogue is the national convention of a
political party."
It was only after the states adopted their own constitutions and formed governments
under them, which occurred in a majority of states only after the Congress adopted
the Declaration of Independence (1776), that the respective legislatures assumed the
appointing role.
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deliberations,5 and the two acts it produced having a fundamental or
constitutional character embodied a principle of unanimity: the Dec-
laration of Independence (1776) and the Articles of Confederation
(1781). The Declaration was adopted unanimously, and the Articles
of Confederation explicitly incorporated the rule of unanimity of
states for ratification and taking effect both of the original Articles
and of any amendments to them.6 In neither case was a direct popu-
lar vote called for, which is not surprising in light of the limited roles
of the Congress, first primarily of conducting the war of independence
and then, under the explicit authority of the Articles,7 more generally
of conducting the external affairs of the confederation.
B. State Practice prior to the federal Constitutional Convention
of 1787
1. Adoption of New Constitutions
The individual states showed some variation in approach to the
process of establishing their own governments and constitutions after
the onset of the Revolutionary War in 1775. In late 1775 the Con-
gress itself, in responding to requests for advice from three colonies
on the matter, advocated the indirect democratic or "convention" ap-
proach from which it derived its own legitimacy: it recommended that
they consider the establishment of a new and suitable form of govern-
ment, and that this be done by a "full and free representation of the
people" called by the colonial conventions for the purpose, but it did
not suggest a direct democratic ratification.8 In the first round of
adoptions in 1776-77, under the pressure of the revolutionary war
and the decision to declare independence, ten of the colonies followed
this prescription without a popular vote, while two others simply
adapted their colonial charters and operated under them well into
the 19th century.9
5. Resolution of September 6, 1774, JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
(hereinafter JCC) p. 25, accessed at Library of Congress, American Memory site, on
Aug. 15, 2005: http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/rammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@
lit(jc0019)).
"That in determining questions of this Congress, each Colony or Province shall
have one Vote, the Congress not being possess'd of, or at present being able to procure
proper materials for ascertaining the importance of each Colony."
6. Article XIII: "No alteration should at any time be made in any of the Articles,
unless such alteration be agreed to in a Congress of the United States and be after-
wards confirmed by the legislatures of every State." In fact no amendment was ever
proposed or adopted under this provision, no doubt due to the extreme difficulty of
obtaining such unanimity.
7. The British army and navy surrendered in October 1781, less than 8 months
after the effective date of the Articles.
8. Resolution of Nov. 3, 1775, JCC p. 319 (New Hampshire); Resolution of Nov.
4, 1775, JCC pp. 326-327 (South Carolina); Resolution of Dec. 4, 1775, JCC pp. 403-
404 (Virginia).
9. For an overview of the process in the colonies see Dodd at 10-21.
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The lone example of direct democracy in the adoption of an origi-
nal constitution was Massachusetts, drawing on long-standing tradi-
tions of local government in the New England colonies. Its
independently elected legislature recommended in 1776 that its two
houses meet together in the following year as a "convention," which
in turn adopted a form of constitution and submitted it to popular
vote; it was rejected by the local constituencies in 1778. In the follow-
ing year the legislature then submitted to popular vote the questions
whether (i) a new constitution should be made, and (ii) the legislature
should call a new convention for that purpose. The vote was affirma-
tive on both questions, and the call for convention issued, the dele-
gates to be popularly elected. In 1780 the convention agreed on a
proposed constitution which was approved by the voters.10
In 1779, after much controversy had arisen over the lack of popu-
lar vote to ratify its 1776 constitution, New Hampshire followed Mas-
sachusetts' lead, obtaining popular approval for electing a convention
to consider replacing the 1776 document, and submitting the conven-
tion's proposed replacement to a popular vote requiring a two-thirds
majority for ratification; although the first vote failed, a second vote
in 1783 was successful."
2. Provisions for Amendment
About half of the state constitutions adopted in the revolutionary
period contained provisions regulating amendments. They followed
several patterns: two simply required greater majorities in each
house of their legislatures for amendments than for ordinary laws;12
one required that amendments be proposed by the legislature, be
published at least 3 months before the next legislative election, and
then be confirmed by the next legislature;13 and four adopted varia-
tions on the Continental Congress's convention formula, of which
only New Hampshire specifically provided for a popular vote on the
convention's product.' 4
10. See the historical note appended by the Massachusetts official site for the
Constitution of 1780, at http://www.mass.gov/legis/const.htm#cart009.htm, accessed
9/2/2005, and Dodd at pp. 8ff.
11. For a description of the New Hampshire process see Dodd at pp. 3-8.
12. Delaware Constitution of 1776, art. 30 (2/3 vote in each house); South Caro-
lina Constitution of 1778, art. XLIV (absolute majority of the members of each house,
rather than a majority of a quorum). Texts of the original constitutions accessed at
the Avalon Project of Yale Law School (hereinafter Avalon) at http://www.yale.edul
lawweb/avalon/18th.htm.
13. Maryland Constitution of 1776, art. LIX.
14. Georgia Constitution of 1777, art. LXIII (proposals from county voters); Penn-
sylvania Constitution of 1776, sect. 47 (proposals from a Council of Censors); Massa-
chusetts Constitution of 1780, Ch. VI, art. X (calling for a vote in 1795 on whether to
hold a convention); New Hampshire Constitution of 1784, art. 99 (calling for a vote in
1791 on whether to hold a convention).
488 [Vol. 54
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C. The Federal Convention and the Constitution of 1787
When the Congress became persuaded, soon after adoption of the
Articles of Confederation, that revisions should be considered in or-
der to strengthen its powers in relation to the states, it adopted the
convention method for the purpose; but its 1787 resolution called for
delegates to the Convention to be "appointed by the several states,"
without requiring that they be chosen by a "full and free representa-
tion of the people."' 5 In conformity to the Articles, the resolution did
not call for the Convention to decide finally; rather, it would report to
the Congress and the state legislatures who appointed its delegates,
and its proposal would have to be approved by the Congress as well
as by the states.
The delegates represented most positions on most of the issues
that animated the call for constitutional change: large states versus
small states, nationalists versus localists, republicans (government
by representation) versus democrats (government by the people),
slaveholders and opponents of slavery, and so on. The document they
finally produced achieved at least the framework for a stronger cen-
tral government; but it famously embodied a number of compromises,
especially from the democratic perspective,' 6 and the prevailing view
of the delegates toward popular democracy as practiced in the states
was skeptical.' 7 In terms of the prospects for introducing direct de-
mocracy into the amendment process at the federal level, the most
crucial of these compromises concern (a) the structure of the legisla-
tive branch and (b) the amendment process itself. In place of the
Continental Congress as a unitary body operating under the princi-
ples of equality of states in voting and unanimity in constitutional
decision-making, the delegates created a two-tiered legislature with
one house popularly elected whose seats are allocated among the
states according to population (House of Representatives) and the
other appointed by the state legislatures with two seats for each state
(Senate). In Article V governing the amendment process they ex-
pressly forbade any amendment depriving any state of its equal vote
in the Senate without its consent. Many of the other "anti-demo-
cratic" compromises have been superseded by subsequent amend-
ments and their interpretation-abolition of slavery (13th A.),
gradual extension of the right to vote to all adult citizens regardless
of race, gender or wealth (14th, 15th, 19th, 23rd and 26th As.), and
15. Resolution of February 21, 1787, JCC p. 74. In the end one state, Rhode Is-
land, refused to participate in the Convention.
16. For an overview of the issues with an assessment of present possibilities for
change, see ROBERT A. DAHL, How DEMOCRATIC Is THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION?
(2001) (hereinafter Dahl, Democratic).
17. See, for a discussion of the various ways in which this attitude influenced the
Convention: THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION ch. 5 (1993) (herein-
after Anderson).
20061 489
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direct popular election of senators (17th A.), for the most obvious ex-
amples-but no serious effort has been made (or seems likely to be
made)18 to change the structure of the Senate or the process of
amendment.
In Art V, two methods are provided for proposing constitutional
amendments: by the Congress on a two-thirds vote of each house, or
by a national convention to be called by Congress on application of
two-thirds of the state legislatures. There are also two methods of
ratification, both requiring approval by three-fourths of the states: by
the state legislatures, or by conventions in the states, with Congress
to make the choice between these two options. As far as the records
of the Convention show, the article elicited relatively little debate
and no proposals that would have called for a referendum or other
direct democratic involvement in the process, or for any departure
from the strict one-state-one-vote rule. There was no reference to the
provisions for amendment in the state constitutions beyond the fact
that they existed and had done no harm.19 On the other hand the
method finally chosen by the Convention for state ratification of the
original instrument-embodied in a recommendation which was de-
livered to the Congress along with the text and implemented by the
Congress in its transmission to the stateS20-imposed the more dem-
ocratic convention process on the states. This process in turn pro-
duced a far-reaching and intensive public debate both in- and outside
the state conventions, and an incomparably rich documentation on
constitution-making. 21
In practice under Article V a national convention has never been
successfully invoked by the states to propose amendments, nor has
Congress ever chosen to order conventions at the state level for ratifi-
cation of the amendments it has proposed. The amendment process
has been successfully invoked only 17 times in 216 years, producing
27 articles of amendment, 22 and each time it has been Congress pro-
posing and the state legislatures ratifying. Perhaps still more re-
18. Dahl, Democratic at 144 ff. makes this point persuasively.
19. Anderson at 158. See also relevant excerpts from the records and notes of
various participants at PHILIP KURLAND AND RALPH LERNER, EDS., THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION, Art. V section 2 (hereinafter Founders), accessed August 19, 2005 at
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a5s2.html.
20. Resolution of the Convention of September 17, 1787, para 1. Text reproduced
by Yale Law School, Avalon Project, at http://www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/const/
ressub01.htm accessed September 5, 2005.
21. For a recent compilation see BERNARD BAYLIN, ED., THE DEBATE ON THE CON-
STITUTION (2 VOLS., LmRARY OF AMERICA, 1993) (hereafter Debate on the Constutition).
22. The first effort, mounted in 1789 at the very first session of Congress in re-
sponse to demands of the states in their ratifications of the original document, in-
cluded 12 proposed amendments, of which 10 were ratified and took effect in 1791
(Amendments 1-10, the "Bill of Rights"), and another was finally ratified two centu-
ries later and took effect in 1992 (Amendment 27). All the others (11-26) were
adopted separately as single proposals.
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vealing, Congress has made only five other proposals for amendment,
which failed to obtain the required number of state ratifications. 2 3
Finally, in one of its rare decisions on the amendment process, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that a state's constitutional provision,
which called for a popular referendum on the state legislature's ratifi-
cation of a proposed amendment to the federal constitution, was in-
consistent with Art. V and therefore invalid. 24 The process has
therefore proven to be at least as difficult as proponents probably in-
tended, 25 though not impossible as some critics feared 26 and as it
surely would have been if the Articles' rule of unanimity had been
retained.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUM AND CITIZEN
INITIATIVE IN THE STATES
A. Referendum
1. New, Original and Revised Constitution
As indicated above, Massachusetts was the first state to submit
its proposed original constitution to a vote of the people, in 1778, and
New Hampshire submitted its second constitution to a vote in 1780
and 1783. In each instance it appears that the decision to submit to a
vote was made by the convention that drafted the document, without
any binding rule of law requiring it to do so. Between 1789 and 1816,
on the other hand, ten states adopted new or original constitutions
without direct ratification by popular vote, the adopting authority be-
ing either a popularly elected convention called by the legislature 27 or
23. See MacMillan Law Library of Emory University School of Law, "Amend-
ments Never Ratified of the United States Constitution," at http://www.law.emory.
edu/FEDERAL/usconstinotamend.html, accessed August 20, 2005. These would have
revoked the citizenship of anyone receiving a title of nobility from a foreign country
(1801), precluded the granting of power to Congress to interfere with slavery (1861),
granted Congress power to regulate child labor (1926), prohibited discrimination on
the basis of sex (1972), and granted the District of Columbia (national capitol district)
the rights of a state in respect of representation in Congress, electing the President
and Vice President, and ratifying constitutional amendments (1978).
24. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
25. See James Madison, in The Federalist No. 43:
"The mode [of introducing useful alterations] preferred by the Convention
seems to be stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against
that extreme facility which would render the Constitution too mutable; and
that extreme difficulty which might perpetuate its discovered faults. It more-
over equally enables the general and the state governments to originate the
amendment of errors as they may be pointed out by the experience on one
side or on the other."
GEORGE W. CAREY AND JAMES MCCLELLAN (EDS.), THE FEDERALIST at p. 228 (2001).
26. For a pessimistic example see An Old Whig (George Bryan, et al.), "No
Amendments Will Ever Be Made Without Violent Convulsion or Civil War", in 1 De-
bate on the Constitution 122 ff. (letter to a newspaper published in 1787).
27. Pennsylvania (1790), Delaware (1792), Kentucky (1792 and 1799), Tennessee
(1796), Georgia (1798), Ohio (1802), Louisiana (1812), and Indiana (1816). See The
4912006]
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such a convention passing only on proposals made by an unelected
Council of Censors28 or simply the legislature itself.2 9
The next wave of true referenda on new constitutions began with
two more New England states, Connecticut (1818) and Maine
(1819).30 New York (1821) was the first outside of New England to
submit a proposed new constitution to popular vote, Virginia (1829)
followed suit, and the practice became predominant in the course of
the 19th century.3 ' Aside from Delaware, which has maintained its
rejection of popular ratification throughout its history, the principal
deviations from the norm were in some southern states during and
after the civil war and in the late 19th century where issues of seces-
sion, post-war reconstruction and the "Jim Crow" disenfranchisement
of black citizens were on the leadership agendas and probably made a
full popular vote seem too risky.32 The last of these was Virginia in
1902, and no new or substantially revised state constitution has been
adopted since then without a popular vote.
2. The Role of the Constitutional Convention
Historically, the preferred vehicle for major revisions of existing
state constitutions and creation of new ones has been the popularly
elected convention, which has often been called by a state legislature
without explicit authority in the existing governing document.33 The
power to call a convention is understood to be inherent in the people
and their representatives. 3 4 At the present, 41 of the 50 state consti-
tutions explicitly provide for the calling of a convention. All but one
of those provide for a call by the legislature,35 but the degree of regu-
lation of the process varies considerably from state to state. It is com-
Green Papers, Constitutions of the Several States, compiled at http://www.thegreen
papers.com/slg/constitution.phtml visited August 30, 2005.
28. Vermont (1793), pursuant to a provision in its original constitution requiring
a Council of Censors to convene every 7 years and to submit its proposals, if any, to a
popularly elected convention for ratification or rejection. See Dodd at p. 41.
29. South Carolina (1790), pursuant to a provision in the constitution of 1778 re-
quiring an absolute majority of all members in each house of the legislature.
30. Dodd at p. 64. Rhode Island submitted a constitution to the people in 1824,
which was rejected.
31. See Dodd at pp. 64 ff.
32. See Dodd at pp. 65 ff.
33. Among the more recent examples: New Jersey's convention of 1946, which
produced a new Constitution, still in effect, which itself has no provision for constitu-
tional conventions for purposes of amendment, see Constitution of 1947 Art. IX.
34. See Dodd at pp. 44 ff. See also In re Opinion to the Governor, 55 R.I. 56, 178
Atl. 433 (1935), which held that "the right of the people to make and alter their consti-
tutions of government", acknowledged in the state's constitution, was sufficient au-
thority for the legislature's power to enact laws calling for a convention in the absence
of an explicit denial of such authority, provided that the people themselves approved;
and, to the same effect, Bennett v. Jackson, 186 Ind. 533, 116 N.E. 921, 923
(Ind.1917).
35. Florida requires a popular initiative to propose a convention, Constitution of
1968 Art. XI sec. 4, resulting in a popular vote on whether to call one. Montana Con-
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mon (though not universal) to require a supermajority in the
legislature, a popular vote to approve the call for a convention, and a
popular vote to ratify a convention's proposed changes.36 The calling
of a convention is clearly a major project under any of these provi-
sions, and it is not a regular event. The most recent state convention
was in Rhode Island in 1986, although serious discussion of it is cur-
rently taking place in a few states.3 7 In any case, popular ratification
has been the norm for the last century, whether or not the existing
document explicitly requires it.
3. Provisions for Amendment: Proposals by the Legislature
By the mid-19th Century, essentially all state constitutions con-
tained explicit provisions governing the process of amendment and/or
revision, and all do so today. There are two sources of proposals for
amendment, in addition to the traditional convention discussed
above: the state legislature, and citizen initiative. Both are subject to
varying regulations from state to state.
Proposals by the legislature are authorized by all and are the
most common in most states. All require approval of both houses of
the legislature (except for Nebraska, which has only one house), with
two types of qualification: (a) thirty-two states require a
supermajority vote in each house, most often two-thirds or less often
three-fifths, and all but a few states define their majorities by the
number of members elected and not merely by the number voting on
the proposition; and (b) fourteen states require that proposals be ap-
proved by two successive legislatures, usually with an intervening
general election during which the pending proposals would be known
to the public but not appear on the ballot as such, although a few
require the second vote only if the first did not receive a
supermajority in each house.38 South Carolina has an indirect vari-
ant (adopted in 1868): the first legislature proposes the amendment
by a two-thirds majority, and submits it to the people in the next gen-
eral election; if the popular vote is positive, the new legislature then
must approve by the same supermajority in order for it to become
stitution Art. XIV sec. 2 permits such an initiative as an alternative method of getting
the question on the election ballot.
36. See Book of the States (2005), Table 1.4 and notes, at pp. 15-16. In the seven
states making no provision for a popular ratification of the convention's proposals, the
convention itself is understood to have discretion to require it if the existing document
doesn't explicitly foreclose it. Dodd at p. 92.
37. See Janice C. May, "State Constitutional Developments in 2004", in Book of
the States 2005 (hereinafter May 2004) at p. 3.
38. See Book of the States (2005), Table 1.2 at pp. 12-13. Two additional states
which require a second legislative vote only if the first does not approve by a
supermajority - Hawaii (Art. XVII sec. 3) and New Jersey (Art. IX sec. 1) - do not
specify that the second approval be by a newly elected legislature, so long as it is in a
subsequent session.
2006] 493
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part of the constitution.39 Thus South Carolina and Delaware (which
does not require a popular vote at all) are the only two states in which
popular approval is not the final validation of the legislature's pro-
posals for amendment, although in South Carolina the electorate still
has the power of binding rejection.
In sum, the constitutional referendum is constitutionally re-
quired-a prerequisite to validity and legal effectiveness-in 49 of
the 50 states for amendment proposals by the legislature, and in 48
states that referendum is binding and final whether the vote is af-
firmative or negative.
B. Initiative
1. Proposals by Citizen Initiative Generally
The first provision in an American constitution calling for citizen
initiative in proposing specific constitutional amendments was in the
first Georgia constitution (1777), pursuant to which amendments
could only be proposed by petitions signed by a majority of voters in
each county, then to be ratified or rejected by a convention called by
the legislature for the purpose. 40 The process whereby so many sig-
natures could be obtained without an election as such was not speci-
fied. It was clearly impossible to meet, and it was dropped, unused,
from the next Georgia constitution adopted just 12 years later.41 The
idea then appears to have gone into hibernation everywhere for a
century.
Citizen initiative as a direct means of proposing legislation or
constitutional amendment was next publicly advocated in its modern
form by reformers in South Dakota and New Jersey in 1885, respond-
ing to social and economic upheavals brought about by the Industrial
Revolution and to widespread corruption of the legislative process of
many if not most states that prevented the adoption of remedial
laws.4 2 Another advocate came on the scene shortly thereafter, hav-
ing visited Switzerland to study the workings of initiative and refer-
endum in that country, and formed a group trying to persuade major
national political parties to include these mechanisms in their party
platforms. 43 While the major parties demurred, the Socialist Labor
Party and the Populist Party did endorse direct democracy, and the
increasingly powerful labor unions also took up the cause. The first
state adoptions came in the Midwest where the Populists were
39. See Dodd at p. 123; current South Carolina Constitution art. XVI sec. 1.
40. Georgia Constitution of 1777, Art. LXVIII.
41. Georgia Constitution of 1789, Art. IV sec. 7; see Dodd at 42.
42. DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE REVOLUTION
(1989)(hereinafter Schmidt) at p. 5.
43. Schmidt at pp. 6f., citing JAMES W. SULLIVAN, DIRECT LEGISLATION THROUGH
THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM (1892).
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strongest: Nebraska adopted direct democracy for municipalities in
1897, and South Dakota was the first to adopt an amendment to its
constitution providing for initiative and referendum of legislation on
a state-wide basis (1898). Oregon (1902) was the first state to extend
the initiative and referendum process to constitutional amendments,
quickly using it to effect substantial constitutional reforms."
In the early 20th century the Progressive movement adopted
much of the Populist and Socialist programs, with Initiative and Ref-
erendum at the forefront, thereby giving these reforms a broader na-
tional base under such major party leaders as Theodore Roosevelt
and Woodrow Wilson.4 5 By the time this movement ran its course
toward the end of the First World War, 22 states had adopted some
form of state-wide initiative process; 11 of these provided for direct
initiative of constitutional amendments, while two others adopted so-
called "indirect initiative" provisions which interpose legislative ac-
tion regarding the proposals between the proponents and the vot-
ers.46  The most notable of the latter is Massachusetts, which
requires that a joint session of the legislature vote on any initiative
proposal and that it receive the affirmative support of at least 25 per-
cent of the membership, in each of two successive legislatures, before
it can be put on the ballot; and it allows the legislature at either ses-
sion to amend the proposal by a 75 percent vote.4 7 This process has
proven quite difficult to navigate: only three initiative amendments
have succeeded in getting on the ballot in 87 years, and only two have
been approved by the voters.4 8
A revival of interest in the initiative after World War II brought
five more states into the fold, including two authorizing direct and
44. Schmidt at pp. 8-9. In addition to adopting statutes requiring political parties
to select their candidates through a primary election rather than through appoint-
ment by party leadership (1904) and establishing significant new taxes (1906),
Oregonians amended their constitution to require a popular referendum on all
amendments proposed by constitutional conventions and to allow initiative and refer-
endum at the local government level (1906), as well as to introduce recall of elected
officials (1908). See M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAc (2003)
(hereinafter Waters) at p. 360.
45. Schmidt at 9-10; PHILIP L. DuBois AND FLOYD FEENEY, LAWMAKING BY INITIA-
TIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS (1998) (hereinafter Dubois and Feeney) at pp.
16f.
46. Waters at p. 12.
47. Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, Amendment XLVIII (1918). Section 2 of
that amendment originally required that an initiative for constitutional amendment
be signed by 25,000 voters; Amendment LXXXI, adopted in 1950, changed that re-
quirement to the equivalent of 3% of the votes cast for governor in the previous gen-
eral election. Nevada adopted a similar indirect initiative provision in 1912, which
did not lead to a popular vote until 1958 (when an initiative stiffened the require-
ments for statutory initiatives), and which was repealed in 1962; see Waters at pp. 14
and 295. Colorado's Art. V sec. 1(5) requires that proposals be submitted to the legis-
lature's research and drafting office, which is limited to making public comment on
issues of drafting and form.
48. See the table of Massachusetts initiatives in Waters at pp. 217 ff.
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one a modified form of indirect constitutional initiative;49 and it per-
suaded three other states to extend their existing provisions to in-
clude direct constitutional initiatives.50 Nonetheless, further
expansion into other states now appears unlikely, even though use of
the device in many of the states where it is authorized remains
high.5 1
There are thus 18 states now authorizing constitutional amend-
ment initiatives, all of which require a popular vote as the final rati-
fying act before any changes take effect. These are predominantly
western and mid-western states-only one from the northeast (Mas-
sachusetts) and two from the southeast (Florida and Mississippi),
and of these only Florida has been moderately active-but they in-
clude many of the most populous, fastest-growing or otherwise influ-
ential states (California, Ohio, Michigan, Missouri, Colorado,
Arizona), and provide testing grounds for many issues of national po-
litical interest.
In the early years of initiative, government reforms and democ-
ratization of the political process were the primary focus of amend-
ment proposals: openness and accountability of government,
extension of the vote to women, democratization of the selection pro-
cess for candidates for major offices, direct election of U.S. senators,
reapportionment of seats in the legislature on the basis of population
rather than elimination of taxes on the exercise of voting rights, and
the like-many of which eventually became law nationwide by means
of amendment or reinterpretation of the federal constitution. 52 In
the 1930's a Nebraska initiative created the only unicameral legisla-
ture in the country, and amendments in a number of states purport-
ing to legalize the sale and consumption of liquor led to the repeal of
the federal constitutional amendment imposing national prohibition
(which itself had been anticipated by state initiatives).53 In the
1970's and 1980's, tax reform and expenditure controls were common,
led by passage of Proposition 13, the 1978 California initiative
49. Alaska (1956) and Wyoming (1968) adopted initiative and referendum for
statutes only, while Florida (1972) and Illinois (1970) adopted provisions limited to
constitutional initiative, Waters at p. 12. Mississippi indirect initiative provision
(1992) guarantees that initiative proposals with sufficient signatures get on the bal-
lot, but provides the legislature an opportunity to approve or disapprove an initiative
proposal before the election in hopes of influencing the vote, or to propose amend-
ments to an initiative proposal which would go on the ballot along with the original as
options for the voters.
50. Montana (1972) and South Dakota (1972) extended their direct initiative pro-
visions to constitutional amendments, see Waters at p. 12; Nevada (1962) replaced its
indirect amendment provision with one allowing for direct initiative, Nevada Consti-
tution Art. 19 sec. 4.
51. See Magleby at pp. 218-219.
52. See Schmidt at 15 ff. At the statutory level, much was enacted for the protec-
tion of workers and unions, provision of education and infrastructure services and
welfare programs for the poor, disabled and elderly.
53. Id. at 18, 20.
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amendment which imposed significant limits on property taxes.54
Many initiatives in the late 1980's and 1990's limited the number of
terms that legislators and other elected officials may serve.55 More
recently the hot-button issues have been mostly social ones, with
criminal justice reform (more severe and predictable penalties includ-
ing death, procedural rights for crime victims, and the like), affirma-
tive action (also referred to as racial preferences), homosexuality56
and gay marriage57 among the prominent subjects.
The initiative has been controversial from the beginning, and
there is a vast literature criticizing and defending the device. Promi-
nent among the complaints particularly relevant to the constitutional
initiative are that the cost of getting a proposal on the ballot is too
high to be available to groups which cannot raise substantial
amounts of money,58 that initiative proposals are more likely to be
badly drafted,59 that proponents are likely to be "interest groups"
whose interests are narrow and self-serving,60 and that initiatives
are susceptible to being used to exploit prejudice against minori-
ties.61 These claims are disputed and difficult to evaluate as reasons
for abandoning the initiative altogether, but can be cause enough for
concern to justify imposing some limitations on the use of the device.
The following review of requirements and restrictions adopted in va-
rious states will give some indication of the impact of such concerns.
2. Procedural Requirements
In all states allowing the constitutional initiative, proponents
must submit petitions signed by a certain number of eligible voters
54. Now California Constitution Art. XIIIa. Schmidt ch. 6, "Tax Revolt", recounts
the history of that campaign and its influence on other states. Only two other states
adopted major tax cuts (Massachusetts and Idaho, by legislative initiative), and six-
teen other major tax cut initiatives in eight states were all rejected by the voters in
the six years after Proposition 13, id. at p. 39. See also Pete Sepp, "A Brief History of
I&R and the Tax Revolt," in Waters at pp. 496 ff.
55. See Paul Jacob, "Term Limits and the I&R Process", in Waters at pp. 505 ff.
56. See Amy Pritchard, "A Brief History of Gay Rights Related Initiatives and
Referendum," in Waters at 494 ff.
57. Thirteen state constitutional amendments banning gay marriage were before
the voters in 2004, including six proposed by initiative, and all passed handily, see
May 2004 at pp. 4-5.
58. See, e.g., DAVID BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS AND
THE POWER OF MONEY (2000), esp. ch.2; Comment, Reforming Direct Democracy: Les-
sons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1202 ff. (2005) (hereinafter Lessons from
Oregon).
59. Compare Dubois and Feeney at pp. 113-114, and Richard Collins, How Demo-
cratic Are Initiatives?, 72 U.COLO.L.REv. 983, 996f. (2001) (hereinafter Collins), with
Schmidt at p. 34-35.
60. See Lessons from Oregon at pp. 1206 ff.
61. Compare Lessons from Oregon at pp. 1209 ff., with John Gastil, Mark A.
Smith, and Cindy Simmons, "There's More Than One Way to Legislate: An Integra-
tion of Representative, Direct, and Deliberative Approaches to Democratic Govern-
ance", 72 U.COLO.L.REv. 1005, 1009 ff. (2001).
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endorsing their proposal. With the exception of North Dakota, which
requires a number equal to four percent of the total population of the
state at the last census, all of these states define the required number
as a percentage of votes cast in the last previous general election:
most use the votes for governor (the state's chief executive), but
others use the state's secretary of state, national presidential candi-
dates, the state office for which the greatest number of votes were
cast, or all voters. 62 The percentages vary from three percent in Mas-
sachusetts to 15 percent in Arizona and Oklahoma, and nine states
also require some degree of geographic distribution of the residences
of the signers. 63 The petitions must be submitted to a specified state
officer (typically the secretary of state, who in most states is responsi-
ble for the administration of statewide elections), who will verify the
qualifications of the signers and that the number of valid signatures
meets the requirement. In some states a public official such as the
attorney general is responsible for writing the ballot language
describing the gist of the proposed amendment for the voter.
Several attempts at regulating the process of gathering signa-
tures on initiative proposals have been successfully challenged before
the U.S. Supreme Court as violations of the proponents' freedom of
speech, on principles applicable to all election campaigns. The lead-
ing initiative case is Meyer v. Grant,64 which held that a Colorado law
prohibiting the gathering of signatures by paid workers constituted a
limitation on political speech by limiting proponents' opportunities to
communicate their message to voters, and was subject to "exacting
scrutiny." This regulation failed because there was no showing that
paid gatherers were more likely to commit fraud than volunteers.
Subsequent cases invalidated Colorado's requirements that the gath-
erers themselves be registered voters and that they wear a badge
with their name on it, and that petitioners report names and pay-
ments to gatherers; 65 and (in an initiative case) Ohio's general prohi-
bition against distribution of anonymous campaign literature.66
Finally, every state authorizing constitutional initiative requires
a popular vote to ratify the proposal, and defines the majority re-
quired in the popular vote by one of a number of variations. Most
simply require a majority of those who vote on the amendment, but
many go further by requiring a simple majority vote in two successive
general elections, or that the simple majority on the amendment also
62. See Book of the States (2005), Table 1.3 at p. 14.
63. Id.
64. 486 U.S. 414 (1988). It drew on the Supreme Court's groundbreaking decision
in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), invalidating numerous provisions in a federal
statute regulating campaigns for federal office. For a review of the initiative cases see
Lessons from Oregon at 1212-1215.
65. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
66. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
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represent a minimum percentage (30-40 percent) of the total votes
cast in the election, or either a majority of the total votes cast in the
election or two-thirds of the votes cast on the amendment, or a two-
thirds majority only on measures providing for new taxes or fees, or
that an amendment proposing to impose a supermajority voting re-
quirement for some future government act itself be approved by the
same supermajority.67
3. Requirements and Limitations as to Form and Scope
A number of states impose formal requirements which can have
a substantial impact on how an initiative is presented and how ambi-
tious it can be, and which have given rise to significant litigation.
Three important types can be identified: (a) limiting initiative pro-
posals to amendment(s), as distinguished from revisions which can
only be proposed by conventions or (in some cases) the legislature; (b)
limiting each amendment proposal to a single subject; and (c) requir-
ing each amendment proposed to be voted on separately. These re-
strictions are clearly related to each other by a common assumption
about the capacity of the electorate and/or citizen proponents to deal
with complex legislative issues, and require definition of "revision"
and "(single) amendment," on which state courts have reached differ-
ing conclusions. All of these formal requirements first appear in
state constitutions as applied to amendment proposals by the legisla-
ture, and continue to be applied in many non-initiative states, but
they can have particular force in the case of initiatives because of the
less deliberative process whereby many if not most initiative propos-
als are generated, and of the controversial subject-matter of many
such proposals. Each has recently been interpreted by the courts in
one or more of the most active initiative states as a barrier to a num-
ber of controversial initiative amendment proposals.
a. Amendment, but not revision
From its inception, the California provision governing amend-
ments recognized two powers of the legislature: it could, by a majority
vote in each house, propose "any amendment, or amendments to this
Constitution,"68 and it could, by a two-thirds vote in each house, rec-
ommend the calling of a convention to "revise and change this entire
constitution."69 In both instances the addressee of its action would be
the electorate, voting either to ratify proposed amendments or to ap-
prove the calling of a convention. In 189470 the state supreme court
67. Book of the States 2005, Table 1.3 at p. 14.
68. Constitution of 1849, Art. X sec. 1; Constitution of 1879, Art. XVIII sec. 1.
69. Art. X sec. 2 (1849); Art. XVIII sec. 2 (1879).
70. Livermore v. Waite, 103 Cal. 113, 36 P. 424, 25 L.R.A. 312 (1894) (dictum, the
case before it was decided on other grounds).
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said that the provision was to be strictly construed and that the legis-
lature could not "assume the function of a ... convention, and pro-
pose for adoption by the people a revision of the entire constitution
under the form of an amendment."71 In this connection it defined
"amendment" as "an addition or change within the lines of the origi-
nal instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the
purpose for which it was framed."72 A series of subsequent decisions
have given detailed content to this concept.
In 1911 the power of initiative was adopted, authorizing citizens
to propose "statutes and amendments to the Constitution."73 In 1948
the court invalidated a proposed initiative amendment that dealt
with at least 12 distinct subjects affecting most areas of the existing
constitution, contained more than a third as many new articles, sec-
tions and words as the entire existing constitution, and would have
involved more extensive changes than those effected by the most re-
cent revision by convention. 74
In 1962 an amendment proposed by the legislature responded to
this line of decisions by specifically authorizing the legislature to pro-
pose revisions as well as amendments, while raising the legislative
vote requirement to two-thirds in each house for either type of propo-
sal. Almost 30 years later the supreme court reviewed an initiated
provision-part of a comprehensive proposal designed to reform the
criminal justice system to provide more protection to crime victims-
which required that the state's constitutional provisions relating to
rights of the accused in criminal cases (a) be interpreted in a manner
consistent with the U.S. Constitution, and (b) not be interpreted to
afford greater rights to accused persons (including juveniles) than
those afforded by the U.S. Constitution. Here the court focused not
on the number and variety of changes effected ("quantitative" revi-
sion, as in the McFadden case mentioned above) but on the funda-
mental nature of a single change ("qualitative" revision, affecting the
"nature of our basic governmental plan"). It found that the second
part of this proposal in effect delegated to the U.S. Supreme Court
the function of interpreting the state constitution's fundamental
criminal defense rights and was therefore invalid,75 although the re-
mainder was not affected by that invalidity.76 On the other hand, in
the following year the court upheld an initiative measure which (a)
71. 103 Cal. at 118, 36 P. at 426.
72. 103 Cal. at 118-119, 36 P. at 426. The Michigan supreme court, also in dictum
interpreting similar but not identical language, embraced essentially the same dis-
tinction in Carton v. Secretary of State, 151 Mich. 337, 340, 115 N.W. 429, 430 (1908).
See also Dodd at pp 260ff.
73. Constitution Art. 2 sec. 8(a).
74. McFadden v. Jordan, 32 Cal.2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
75. Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal.3d 336, 351f., 801 P.2d 1077, 1086f., 276
Cal.Rptr. 326, 335f. (1990).
76. 801 P. 2d at 1089f., giving effect to a severability clause in the initiative itself.
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limited the number of terms in office that members of the legislature
or the most important state-wide executive or administrative officers
can serve, and (b) limited total government expenditures and expend-
itures specifically for the operation of the legislature; it found that
opponents' claims of far-reaching consequences for the effective oper-
ation of government were too speculative to establish a qualitative
revision.77
Courts in other states with similarly worded constitutional
amendment provisions-whether or not they include the power of ini-
tiative-have divided on whether their convention provisions are to
be regarded as the exclusive method for revision. In Alabama and
Oregon the provision was held to be exclusive,78 while in Ohio, Geor-
gia, Kentucky, and Idaho the courts take the position that the people
retain the inherent power to revise their constitution by any means
they wish.79
b. Single-subject rule
Seven initiative states have adopted the rule-some specific to
the initiative process, some applicable to all amendments-which
limits any proposed constitutional amendment to a single subject.80
In principle it means only that for each subject a separate amend-
ment must be proposed, but in practice that can be a significant im-
pediment to gaining approval for the proponents' goals in a proposal
of any complexity, so that much depends on the breadth or narrow-
ness of judicial interpretation of the rule.
We can begin again with California and the Raven case described
above. California's constitutional article on the initiative contains
the following provision, applicable to statutory as well as constitu-
tional initiatives: "An initiative measure embracing more than one
subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect."8
Drawing on a number of prior decisions, the court said that a mea-
sure meets the single-subject requirement if, despite its varied collat-
77. Legislature of the State of California v. Eu, 54 Cal3d 492, 816 P.2d 1309, 286
Cal.Rptr. 283 (1991).
78. State v. Manley, 441 So.2d 864 (Ala. 1983); Holmes v. Appling, 237 Ore. 546,
392 P.2d 636 (1964).
79. State ex rel. Hubbell v. Bettman, 124 Ohio St. 24, 176 N.E. 664 (1931); Wheeler
v. Board of Trustees of Fargo Consol. Sch. Dist., 200 Ga. 323, 37 S.E.2d 322 (1946);
Gatewood v. Mathews, 403 S.W.2d 716 (Ky. 1966); Smith v. Cenarrusa, 93 Idaho 818,
475 P.2d 11 (1970).
80. California Constitution Art. II sec. 8(d); Colorado Constitution Art. V sec.
1(5.5); Florida Constitution Art. XI sec. 3; Mississippi Constitution Section 272 paras.
2, 4; Missouri Constitution Art. XII sec. 2(b); Oklahoma Constitution Section XXIV-1;
Oregon Constitution Art. IV sec. 1(d). The single-subject concept has a long history in
many states of application to ordinary legislative acts.
81. Art. 2 sec. 8(d). The original, substantively identical version was first intro-
duced into the initiative article in 1948 as an extension of the long-standing require-
ment for ordinary legislation, see Perry v. Jordan, 34 Cal.2d 87, 204 P.2d 47 (1949).
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eral effects, all of its parts are 'reasonably germane' to each other and
to the general purpose of the initiative. 82 The court found that the
measure before it constituted a "comprehensive criminal justice re-
form package" for the stated purpose of "strengthen [ing] procedural
and substantive safeguards for victims," and sustained it.83 It em-
phasized the essential legislative process of balancing competing in-
terests, and found that the measure was not too complicated for the
electorate to understand.84
In some states the rule has been more stringently applied. In
Colorado, where the rule was not extended to initiative measures un-
til 1994 in response to a perceived pattern of abuses of the process,
the state supreme court held that in a measure addressing various
aspects of the procedure governing initiative petitions, a provision
eliminating the single-subject requirement for initiatives was not suf-
ficiently related to the procedural issues to be part of the same sub-
ject.85 In doing so it identified two principal concerns underlying the
rule: that measures incapable of passage on their own will be passed
solely because they are joined with more popular ones ("log-rolling"),
and that particular provisions will go unnoticed in the context of
broad and complex proposals. In scarcely ten years of application the
Colorado court has invalidated a half-dozen or more initiatives on
this ground. 86
In other states the single-subject rule, otherwise liberally ap-
plied, has been held violated by a measure that has too great an im-
pact on the core functions of more than one branch of government,
which the California court might characterize as a "qualitative revi-
sion" not appropriate for initiative. Thus the Florida supreme court
has declared invalid an initiative which would have required that 40
percent of all state appropriations (other than lottery proceeds and
federal funds), be allocated to education, on the ground that it would
substantially perform the legislature's fiscal appropriation function
and preempt the governor's veto power, thereby effecting what an
earlier decision characterized as "multiple 'precipitous' and 'cataclys-
mic' changes in the constitution" against which the single-subject
82. 52 Cal.3d 336, 346, 801 P.2d 1077, 1083 - citing in particular Brosnahan v.
Brown, 32 Cal.3d 236, 651 P.2d 274, 186 Cal.Rptr. 30 (1982).
83. 52 Cal. Rptr. at 347f.
84. Id. At 348-9. The only case which has failed this test involved two distinct
limitations on legislative power joined in a single measure, on the rationale that legis-
lators should be more responsive to citizens than to their own interests; this was held
too broad. Senate of the State of California v. Jones, 21 Cal. 4th 1142, 988 P. 2d 1089,
90 Cal.Rptr.2d 810 (1999).
85. In the Matter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submissions Clause for Proposed
Initiative 2001-02 #43, 46 P.3d 438 (Colo. 2002).
86. Cases cited in Initiative 2001-02 #43, 46 P. 3d at pp. 443-445, and In the Mat-
ter of the Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause for 2003-2004 #32 and #33, 76
P.3d 2003 (Colo. 2003).
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rule was intended protect the voters.87 It also invalidated on this
ground a so-called "anti-affirmative action" proposal, which would
have forbidden state and local government bodies from "treating peo-
ple differently based on race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin
in the operation of public education."8 8 The court found that this pro-
posal would have drastically limited all three branches of govern-
ment from taking otherwise appropriate action to remedy the effects
of discrimination against certain disadvantaged minorities, without
clearly indicating those implications as a series of separate proposals
would have done.
c. Separate-vote requirement
Three initiative states (in common with a number of non-initia-
tive states) have a separate vote requirement applicable to amend-
ments generally, including the two (California and Oregon) in which
constitutional initiative is most active and which also have a single-
subject rule specifically for initiatives.89 Of the three, only Oregon's
courts have found this requirement to have a meaning sharply dis-
tinct from the single-subject rule, and that is a quite recent develop-
ment. In Armatta v Kitzhaber90 the Oregon supreme court had
before it a crime victims' rights amendment initiative similar to that
which was invalidated by the California court in Raven as an imper-
missible revision. The Oregon court, however, relied for the first time
on a provision essentially retained from the original constitution of
1859: "When two or more amendments shall be submitted ... to the
voters of this state at the same election, they shall be so submitted
that each amendment shall be voted on separately."9' The court held
that the particular role of the separate-vote requirement was to focus
on the manner in which the proposal changes the existing constitu-
tion, and that the issue is whether "if adopted, the proposal would
make two or more changes to the constitution that are substantive
and that are not closely related."92 The court then found that the
measure before it would change multiple provisions in the state's Bill
of Rights, including at least three not specifically mentioned, and
that these changes were related to one another only in so far as they
affected rights that might be implicated during a criminal investiga-
tion or prosecution; that relationship was held not to be sufficiently
87. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Requirement for Adequate Public
Education Funding, 703 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1997).
88. Advisory Opinion to the Attorney General re Amendment to Bar Government
from Treating People Differently Based on Race in Public Education, 778 So.2d 888
(Fla. 2000).
89. Arizona Constitution art. 21 sec. 1; California Constitution art. 18 sec. 1; Ore-
gon Constitution art. 21 sec. 1, last sentence.
90. 327 Or. 250, 959 P.2d 49 (1998).
91. Oregon Constitution Art. XVII sec. 1, fourth sentence.
92. 327 Or at 277, 959 P.2d at 64 (emphasis added).
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close to satisfy the requirement, where they involve "separate consti-
tutional rights granted to different groups of persons."93 This deci-
sion had an immediate impact on the rate of rejection of proposed
initiative amendments by the secretary of state, on advice from the
attorney general, for failure to comply with this rule,94 and predict-
ably brought intense criticism from interest groups fearing substan-
tial curtailment of the initiative's use. Indeed an initiative
amendment proposal was submitted shortly thereafter which would
have reworded the single-subject and separate-vote requirements ap-
plicable to initiatives so as to overrule the decision, but it in turn was
the subject of a successful challenge in the courts - not by opponents
of the measure but by the petitioners, claiming that the "ballot title"
provided by the state's attorney general pursuant to law would fail to
apprise the voters of the fact that two distinct constitutional require-
ments contained in different articles would be affected and would
have to be voted on separately.95 The rule of Armatta has since been
applied to invalidate a measure which was approved by the voters ten
years earlier, setting term limits for state officials and members of
the national congress - one of the most important of Oregon's initia-
tives which had led a nationwide trend toward term limits. 9 6
93. 327 Or at 283f., 959 P.2d at 67f.
94. See Phillip Bentley, Armata v. Kitzhaber: A New Test Safeguarding the Ore-
gon Constitution from Amendment by Initiative, 78 ORE. L. REV. 1139, 1154f. (1999).
95. Novick v. Myers, 333 Or 154, 36 P.3d 486 (2001). While the court's ruling
simply sent the measure back to the attorney general for rewriting of the ballot title
to conform to the existing requirements, it does not appear that the measure has yet
reached the ballot in proper form.
96. Lehman v. Bradbury, 333 Or. 231, 37 P. 3d 989 (2002).
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